A08: add an integrity seal to backup archives #22
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eagraiclainne/app#22
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Delete branch "%!s()"
Deleting a branch is permanent. Although the deleted branch may continue to exist for a short time before it actually gets removed, it CANNOT be undone in most cases. Continue?
Export/import archives (ADR-0022/0023) are plain gzip+JSON with no integrity seal. A doctored backup restored by a well-meaning admin imports attacker password hashes, API keys, and a known
jwt_secret. Restore semantics make this inherent and the flow is consent-gated, but the UI has no way to warn on tampering.Fix: HMAC the archive with an install-keyed secret (or attach a signed manifest) at export, verify at import, and warn — not block — when the seal is missing or wrong, so cross-install restores still work.
Source: OWASP Top 10 (2025) audit of
v1.1.0, 2026-08-13. File references point at thev1.1.0tree.